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The dollar has been the dominant currency since the World War II. Will the euro ever be able 
to challenge the dollar? In order to understand the chance of the euro against the dollar some 
comparisons are made between them. Starting with the main economic indicators to their 
roles in the international trade, their power and potential in many economical aspects are tried 
to be figured out and compared.  Furthermore, their elasticities, their roles in the international 
financial markets, current account and trade balance of the the two parts are discussed. An 
empirical study on international bonds and notes is made by using the attraction model. All of 
the analyses made in this research show us the potential of the euro to become an international 
currency. Although the dollar has still some advantages over the euro, a bipolar currency 
regime dominated by Europe and the United States may replace the dollar-centered system 
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The  creation  of  the  single  European  currency,  the  euro,  is  the  most  important 
development in the evolution of the international monetary system since the adoption of 
flexible  exchange  rates  in  the  early  1970s.  It  is  comparable  to  the  Bretton  Woods 
conference of 1944, the dollar replacing the pound sterling as the leading currency in the 
interwar period, and even the consolidation of the gold standard in the nineteenth century. 
It  is  obvious  that  the  monetary  union  has  fundamentally  changed  the  structure  of 
international relations.  
 
A successful euro will be the first real rival for the dollar since the latter surpassed 
sterling  as  the  world’s  dominant  money  during  the  interwar  period.  Europe  is 
approximately the equal of the United States in economic output and trade, so why should 
it not be a competitor to the US in also monetary matters? Does the euro have a chance to 
challenge the dollar? The purpose of this paper is to explore prospects for the euro as an 
international currency.  
 
When the euro was introduced on January 1, 1999, it immediately became the world’s 
second  leading  currency.  In  terms  of  economic  and  financial  importance  it  has  been 
behind  only  the  US  dollar  and  well  ahead  of  the  Japanese  yen.  The  euro  took  its 
importance mainly from its role as the domestic monetary unit of the twelve countries that 
form the European Monetary Union (EMU). The GDP of EMU was equal to nearly 80 
percent  of  that  of  the  United  States  and  more  than  double  that  of  Japan.  From  an 
international perspective, the advent of the euro was a very important development for the 
economy and financial system of the rest of the world.  
 
In this paper I try to discuss this very important development and see whether the euro 
has a chance to become an international currency.  We are looking for an answer to the 
question “Does the euro have a chance to challenge the dollar?” Comparisons are made between the euro and the dollar in two respects; their role in the international financial 
markets and in the world trade. 
  2. The Euro vs the Dollar 
 
   
    The main reason for the supremacy of the dollar over the past half-century or more is 
that it has no competition. Although there were periods when the US economy performed 
very poorly, the dollar stayed as the supreme power as it has no competitor. From the 
early 1970s through the early 1990s the US economy grew very slowly and productivity 
growth was especially ordinary. From 1973 to 1981, the US economy experienced high 
inflation including three years of double-digit price increases. In the last 20 years the US 
economy has run large external deficits, especially in the periods 1982-87 and 1998-2003 
those deficits rose at clearly unsustainable rates (Bergsten 2002). The US has become the 
world’s largest debtor country with a negative net international investment position of 
approximately $2.6 trillion at the end of 2002. 
 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s the dollar experienced an important erosion of its 
market share. Also its weakness and instability provided an important motive for the first 
efforts to create the European Monetary System in 1979. Mc Kinnon (2002) believes that 
if a full fledged and stable valued euro had been introduced during this weak time of the 
dollar, the displacement of the dollar would have been substantial. In 1990s the dollar’s 
global finance share stabilized again and has stayed above of any other national currency. 
 
Tavlas (1997) states “In general, the dollar accounts for between 40 and 80 percent of 
the various categories of international currency use, with the categories at the high end of 
this  range  (for  example  foreign  exchange  market  turnover  and  trade  invoicing) 
representing  mainly  the  unit  of  account  and  medium  of  exchange  functions  of  an 
international currency”. 
 
The main reason for that is the fact that the US has remained far larger, especially in 
terms of GDP and also trade and other size variables, than any other country. By the help 
of its incumbency advantages, the dollar has remained dominant and generated a share of 
currency markets about four times as great as its share of world output and trade. After the 
war second key currency of the world was deutsche mark, but it never attained a market share greater than the one-fourth that of the dollar. This was logical as the former West 
Germany’s economy was about one-fourth the size of the US. Japan’s economy was more 
than half as large as America’s but it never realized that portion of world finance, as its 
financial markets were not developed (Bergsten 2002). 
 
There are several factors that contributed to the dominance of the dollar as a stabilizer. 
The first one is the fact that the strong US economic performance and weak European 
economy encouraged international capital to stay  in the US capital market. The stock 
value of the assets did not change although 50 percent of newly issued international bonds 
were denominated in euro. As there were not any quick flows of capital, instability did not 
occur. Secondly, Europe became a less attractive place to invest because of the uncertainty 
of the political situation that was caused by the war in the former Yugoslavia. The third 
factor was the slow economic recovery in Asia, which also prevents capital from flowing 
back at a quick pace. This increased the comparative stability of international financial 
markets and the US dollar exchange rate stayed relatively stable. Japan is still in recession 
and the yen is losing its attractiveness. As a result the yen will probably lose its important 
position in the international monetary system. Fourthly, the US dollar was not affected by 
the Brazil crisis and the instability in Latin America did not spill over to the rest of the 
world.  
 
According  to  Bergsten  (2002)  it  is  clear  that  the  euro  will  provide  the  first  real 
competition for the dollar since the latter’s ascent to global currency dominance. Bergsten 
(2002) states that observing the impact of the transitional effects, which have influenced 
the  international  role  of  the  euro  negatively,  will  be  interesting.  These  caused  the 
movement into dollars first, as investors demanded to rebalance their portfolios to offset 
the  loss  of  the  diversification  benefits  of  multiple  national  currencies  in  Europe  and 
secondly as Eastern and black money balances asked for protecting against the unfamiliar 
new asset (Sinn and Westermann, 2001). 
 
These transitional considerations explain a considerable part of the lag in the euro’s 
acquiring its inevitably large international role, but there are also four additional factors, 
which affect the ultimate timing. Three of these are within the control of the European 
entities themselves while one is completely exogenous (Bergsten, 2002). 
 The first one is the fact that Euroland would need to further integrate its money and 
capital markets to realize the full international potential of its new currency (Portes and 
Rey, 1998). Euro activated the European financial markets both directly and indirectly and 
they have already taken impressive steps forward (Danthine, Giavazzi, and von Thadden, 
2000). There has been no single benchmark security, or yield curve that has developed to 
rival the US Treasury bill and other US government assets. Euroland’s speed to overcome 
these  shortcomings  will  play  a  great  role  in  the  timing  of  euro’s  having  a  share  in 
international asset allocation (Bergsten 2002). 
 
The second important factor is Europe’s need to get its act together institutionally. 
Europe was successful to challenge the previous dominance of the US in trading system 
because of two reasons. The first one is the fact that it had roughly the equal trade volume 
as the US had. Secondly and more importantly it decided to centralize virtually all trade 
policy decisions and negotiations in a single entity. In order to have a full equivalence 
with the US á la trade Euroland must have some organizational reforms that enable it to 
act together and speak with a single voice. 
 
Thirdly, if the economic performance of Europe would improve, the international role 
of  the  euro  would  surely  strengthen.  In  order  to  challenge  the  dollar  effectively,  the 
achievement of dynamic growth is also necessary for the euro, which has already achieved 
convincing price stability (Kawai, 1997). 
 
According to Bergsten (2002) the fourth and perhaps the most important factor is that 
the US probability to foul up for the euro to realize its potential to achieve rough parity 
with the dollar at the core of international monetary system. 
 
If the euro (or any other competitor to dollar) had existed in the late 1970s and 1980s 
what  would  have  happened  to  the  international  role  of  the  dollar?  In  those  years  the 
inflation rate of the US was in double digits, its economic performance was mediocre and 
the US started to run huge external deficits and from being the world’s largest creditor 
shifted to its largest debtor. Even though there was not such a competitor; the global 
market share of the dollar fell substantially (Bergsten, 2002).  
 Since the advent of generalized currency convertibility in the postwar period the major 
dollar depreciations have occurred about once per decade: in 1971-1973, 1978-79, 1985-
87 and 1994-95. A future fall of the dollar could bring important, historic, and systemic as 
well as market and macroeconomic effects. Any particular trade-weighted decrease of the 
dollar would produce a much greater increase in the euro, as America’s major trading 
partners (like Mexico and perhaps Canada) could not accept substantial appreciation of 
their currencies against the dollar. Another major trading partner, Japan might also be too 
weak to accept any significant appreciation.  
 
In this paper a comparison between the international roles of the euro and the dollar 
will be made in order to understand the chance of the euro of becoming an international 
currency.  The  main  constraints  will  be  the  two  currencies’  main  macroeconomic 
indicators,  supply  elasticities,  roles  in  financial  markets,  historical  inflation  rates,  the 
relation between their current account and trade balances, and the roles in global trade. 
 
3.  Comparison of the Main Indicators of the Euro Zone
· · · · and USA 
 
There are many factors that determine whether a currency plays a global role as we 
discussed in the earlier chapters. By looking at Table 3.1 the main indicators of the two 
areas may be compared roughly. The area of the US is significantly larger than the area of 
the Euro Zone, almost four times larger. On the other hand, the population of the Euro 
Zone is slightly higher than that of the US. Size effect is an important issue in determining 
the international role of a currency, but by size we do not mean just the geographical size 
but also the number of people that use the currency. In this aspect the euro and the dollar 
have more or less the same sizes. The size effect also contains the size of the economies of 
the  countries  that  can  be  measured  by  their  gross  domestic  product  (GDP).  By  this 
criterion, the US has an advantage over the Euro area. In all GDP measures the US is 
superior to Euroland and the real GDP growth rate of the US is modestly higher than that 
of the Euro Zone in 2003. Also when we look at the ten year average real GDP growth 
rates we observe the same result (Table 3.2).  
The strength, stability and credibility of the economy are other important issues in 
becoming an international currency. Although the US has a slightly higher inflation rate, 
the  difference  between  the  inflation  rates  of  the  Euro  zone  and  the  US  is  not  very 
                                                 
            · 12 countries that are members of the EMU are taken into account in all the comparisons significant in 2003. The same can be said also for the ten year average inflation rates 
(Table 3.2). Interest rates are also important indicators that show the credibility of the 
country. The long-term interest rates of the US and the Euro zone are more or less the 
same, although the Euro zone has a slightly higher one in 2003. In the ten year averages 
this difference is even as small as 0.1 (Table 3.2). On the other hand even the short-term 
interest rates of the Euro zone is more than one percent higher than that of the US in 2003, 
when the ten year averages is concerned there is a very small difference between the short 
term interest rates of the Euro zone and the US. Unemployment rate is another factor that 
determines the stability of an economy. In this context the US seems to be in a better 
position. While the five years’ average of the unemployment rate is 8.6% in the Euro 
zone, it is 4.9% in the US (Table 3.2). It may be concluded that the US has slightly higher 
credibility  than  the  Euro  land  in  economical  terms,  but  in  the  following  sections  the 
financial terms will be taken separately and the results of those studies are also important 
in determining the credibility of the two currencies. Now it is early to arrive at a definite 
decision. 
 
Table 3.1 Main Indicators of the Euro Zone and USA 
  USA  Euro Zone 
Area (approximately)  9.4 million km
2  2.5 million km
2 
Population (2001)  278,058,900  303,909,700 
GDP at market prices (at current 
prices) 
-  Millions of euro (2003) 
-  Millions of PPS (2002) 









GDP per capita PPS
(1) (2001)  139.5  98.6 
Real GDP growth rate
(2) (2003)  3.1%  0.4% 
Inflation rate
(3) (2003)  2.3%  2.1% 
Interest rates (Annual Average) 
(2003) 
-  Long term
(4) 
-  Short term:3-month 
interbank
 















Seasonally adjusted unemployment 
rate 
5.6%  8.8% 
Exports (2003)  »724 billions $  »1,305 billions € 
Imports (2003)  »1,035 billions $  » 968 billions € 
Trade Balance (2003)  » -546 billions $  » 125 billions $ 
Current Account (2002)  » -481billions $  » 61 billions $ Current Account (% of GDP) 
(2002) 
-4.6  0.9 
GDP Share (2002)
(5) (%)  21.1  15.7 
Share of Export of Goods and 
Services (2002)
(5) (%) 
12.4  31.2 
Share of Population
 (5) (%)  4.7  5.0 
Sources: IMF Annual Report 2003, Eurostat, IFS and author’s own calculations 
(1) The volume index of GDP per capita in Purchasing Power Standards (PPS) is expressed in relation to the 
European Union. The index is calculated from PPS figures and expressed with respect to EU=15 
(2) Growth rate of GDP at constant prices (1995=100) – percentage change on previous year 
(3) Annual average rate of change in Harmonized Indices of Consumer Prices (HICPs) 
(4) 10 year government bond yields, secondary market 
(5) Share of total for world 
 
Besides the above factors the issuer country of an international currency should have a 
production  variety.  This  brings  the  fact  of  climate  variety.  When  the  geographical 
positions of the Europe and the US are observed it can be concluded that both have the 
needed climate variety, being located between approximately 20 to 30 parallels. Both have 
the parts that have sea effects and both have places with terrestrial influences. Of course 
there are differences in the products produced in the US and the Euro zone but in my 
opinion they have approximately the same diversity of products.  
 
Political  power  brings  economical  power,  which  is  a  very  important  issue  for  an 
international  currency.  There  are  many  ideas  on  whether  political  power  brings 
economical power or visa versa, but the idea that is generally accepted is the fact that they 
are closely interrelated. In my opinion, economical power brings political power. I will try 
to explain the reasons of my thought by using the US case. I think no one can deny that 
currently the US is the super power in both economical and political aspect. Also UK was 
the political power having a number of colonies in different parts of the world when her 
currency  was  an  international  currency.  In  the  US  case  as  the  dollar  is  international 
money, it is also demanded by the other countries. What could the US do to feed the other 
countries with dollar? The US started to give current account deficits by increasing its 
imports,  but  this  also  has  a  limit.  No  country  would  want  to  import  things  over  the 
necessary amount that it needed. But although the US was forcing its limits, the rest of the 
world continued to demand more and more dollars. Then the US started to ask for other 
things  rather  than  goods  and  services  like  military  base  in  another  country  or  some 
political decisions in favor of the US to be taken. As a result the dollar being the dominant 
currency brought the US political power. May the Euro zone do the same? That is an 
important question to be answered, but it’s beyond the scope of this thesis. The important thing to be noted here is the fact that if the euro is to be an international currency, the 
European Monetary Union has to go further and become also a political union.  
 
After the end of the Bretton Woods all currencies became fiat monies, meaning that 
they do not have any back up value any more. The currency of a country will not have any 
value other than a paper in case that country collapses. This brings out the fact that there 
should be trust that the country will live forever, in order to trust its currency. This brings 
out another political issue, the strength of the military force. If a country has a strong army 
that means it can resist its enemies and survive in case a war breaks out. A war resulting 
with a collapse of a nation is not a likely case to happen in the contemporary world, but 
being an international currency is not an easy thing. People should believe in your country 
in order to believe in your currency. It is known worldwide that the US has the one of the 
most powerful armies in the world. On the other hand the European Union has also some 
attempts about this issue. The member countries of the union are trying to form a common 
military force for the union. Besides, the European Union is a member of NATO, which is 
an important factor for the security. These may protect the union from the outside effects 
but are not enough for a complete trust, as the union itself may give harm to its identity. If 
not because of the war but because of some other political or economical reasons the 
union  collapses,  then  the  euro  will  have  no  value.  In  order  to  rub  out  these  kinds  of 
thoughts from the people’s minds a political union should also be established between the 
member countries.  
Table 3.2 10 Year and 5 Year Averages of the Main Economic Indicators 
 
  USA  Euro Zone 
Real GDP Growth Rate
 (1)   3.28%  2.04% 
Inflation Rate
(2)  2.46%  1.99% 
Interest rates (Annual Average)  
-  Long term
(3) 
-  Short term:3-month 
interbank
(4) 












Seasonally adjusted unemployment rate
(5)  4.94%  8.6% 
        Source: Eurostat, IFS 
(1)  Growth rate of GDP at constant prices (1995=100) – percentage change on previous year (10 years’ 
average) 
(2)  Annual  average  rate  of  change  in  Harmonized  Indices  of  Consumer  Prices  (HICPs)  (10  years’ 
average) 
(3)  10 year government bond yields, secondary market (10 years’ average) 
(4)  10 years’ average 
(5)  5 years’ average 
 Now  it  is  time  to  go  back  to  our  economical  analysis.  Five  indicators  of  an 
international currency will be taken separately and discussed in a detailed way. The issuer 
country  of  an  international  currency  should  have  high  share  in  global  trade  and  in 
international financial markets. In the following sections the Euro zone and the US will be 
compared according to their strength in these issues. 
 
4.  Euro vs Dollar in Global Trade 
 
Trade is a very crucial factor in determining the international role of a currency. In this 
part first the supply elasticities of the Euro zone and the US will be compared in order to 
understand their adoptability to the changes in the price levels. Afterwards the trends and 
the relationship between the current account and trade balance of the two parts will be 
examined.  High  fluctuations  are  not  acceptable  in  these  accounts  of  an  international 
currency. Besides, there should be a close relationship between the current account and 
trade balance of an international currency in order to able the issuer country to feed the 
world with its own currency. Lastly, the shares of the euro and the dollar in global trade 
are compared. Having a share in the world trade is crucial as it is one of the indicators that 
shows the fact that the currency is used as an invoicing currency. 
 
4.1.Supply Elasticity 
Between the features of international money that we discussed above perhaps the most 
important and measurable characteristic is having an elastic supply curve. Elasticity shows 
how  responsive  supply  is  to  the  changes  in  the  price  level.  A  country  that  issues  an 
international currency should have an elastic supply curve in order to respond quickly to 
the changes in its prices and continue to produce accordingly the demanded amounts. If a 
country is late to adopt to the price changes its currency will not have much chance to 
become an international currency because it will not be able to increase its production 
level  as  the  price  increases,  so  will  not  be  able  to  supply  the  demands  of  the  other 
countries  as  fast  as  needed.  As  a  result  the  demander  countries  will  go  and  buy  the 
products from another country that can supply their needs. Considering the fact that in 
transactions usually the currency of the exporter country is used as a medium of exchange, 
the importance of supply elasticity may be understood better.  
 From theory it is known that that the long run aggregate supply curve is perfectly 
inelastic and may be drawn as a vertical line as shown in the Figure 4.1. In our context the 
important thing is the elasticities of the short run supply curves as we are trying to figure 
out  the  immediate  responses  to  price  level  changes.  We  are  trying  to  find  out  which 
country  is  allocating  its  resources  better  and  giving  fast  responses  to  the  price  level 
changes by increasing or decreasing its production level. Accordingly we are concerned 
with the elasticities of the short run supply curves of the Euro zone and the US.  
 
Now it is time to find out the elasticities of the short run supply curves of the Euro 
zone and the US. The data is selected for four years, as we are concerned with the short-
run. While selecting the period for the US, business cycles are observed and a period with 
good economic performance is chosen. For Euro zone as euro is a very new currency there 
was no chance other than choosing the time period between 2000 and 2003. Although it 
would be more convenient if the same time period was chosen for both of the countries we 
didn’t do so, as 1999-2003 period, especially after September 2001, is an era somehow 
stagnant for the United States. As a result it is preferred to take the time period of 1997-
2000. For the analysis quarterly data of GDP and GDP deflator for the US and the Euro 
zone are used that is obtained from IFS. 
 
First the scatter diagrams of the data are drawn and the correlation and the standard 
deviations of the data are observed. As a result it is decided that there is not a significantly 
high standard deviation and the analysis may be continued using this database. There is an 
important fact that we should be careful about while checking the scatter diagrams. As we 
are trying to form a supply curve, price level is put on the vertical axis and real GDP is 
shown on the horizontal axis, although in mathematics we do the reverse by putting the 
dependent variable on the horizontal axis and independent variable on the vertical axis.  
 
We  know  that  GDP  is  a  function  of  price.  In  the  analysis  two  different  types  of 
functions are used. 
GDP = a + b PL                       (1) 
GDP = a x PL
b                        (2) 
 Equation (1) is a linear function and each price level has its own elasticity. On the 
other hand in equation (2) we have a constant elasticity.   
 
The  regression  results  of  equation  (1)  for  US  are  shown  in  Table  4.1.  From 






PL                        (3) 
Elasticity of supply is a function of price, so by putting different prices elasticities may 
be found. From the data the minimum price, the maximum price is taken and also the 
average mean of the prices is found. These prices are inserted in the estimated equation 
and three different supply elasticities are found. As it may be seen in Table 4.2 the three 
numbers are very close to each other and the supply elasticity of US is around 2.9.  
 
The same process is applied also to the Euro zone data. From Table 4.1 the regression 
results of the Euro zone area may be observed. The CPI data of Euro Zone is searched for 
its  minimum,  maximum  and  average  mean  values.  The  foundings  are  applied  to  the 
estimated equation and the results in Table 4.2 are observed.  
 
Table 4.1 Regression Results 
Sample: 1997:1 2000:4 (US) 
Sample: 2000:1 2003:4 (Euro Zone) 
  a  b  R
2  Adj R
2  DW  F 
US 
           




0.9685  0.9662  0.6009  430.60 
log




0.9646  0.9621  0.5453  381.21 
Euro 
Zone 
           




0.8717  0.8626  0.9743  95.149 
log




0.8727  0.8636  0.9822  95.975 
All coefficients are significant at 1% level. We are aware of the fact that Durbin Watson statistics are below 
the critical value but when we applied the AR (1) Method the result was not significant. As the number of 
observations is small it is decided to leave it this way. Secondly, the logarithmic functions of the data are taken for each country and they are 
regressed. This is done in order to solve for equation (2) and the results are shown in 
Table 4.1 under the column constant elasticity. The X variable of the regression results 
gives directly the elasticity of the supply curve
·.  
 
When we take the logarithmic function of equation (2) we get: 
log GDP = a + b log PL                     (4) 
The b coefficient in equation (4) gives directly the supply elasticity (See Appendix A). 
 
The regression results of the US case are shown in Table 4.1.As expressed before, 
from  this  equation  we  can  directly  say  that  the  supply  elasticity  of  US  is  equals  to 
2.913354. 
 
For the Euro area the regression results at Table 4.1 are found. It can be concluded that 
the supply elasticity of the Euro zone is 0,394084. The elasticities found in each equation 
of the GDP are very close to each other for each country and all may be followed in Table 
4.2. 
 
When Table 4.2 is observed carefully, it may be concluded that the dollar has a huge 
advantage against the euro in terms of supply elasticity. The US has a more elastic supply 
curve than the Euro zone and even the term more elastic does not describe the situation 
well, as there is a huge difference between them. The US have a supply  elasticity of 
almost six times that of the Euro zone and according to microeconomics theory US has an 
elastic supply curve, as its supply elasticity is greater than one. On the other hand this 
cannot be said for the supply elasticity of the Euro zone. The Euro zone has a rather 
inelastic supply curve, having supply elasticity smaller than one. The time period chosen 
for  the  US  is  the  boom  period  of  the  country.  On  the  other  hand  we  had  no  other 
alternative for the Euro zone. As we took the different time periods for the two parts we 
cannot make strong comments. For example the US could have experienced technological 
growth in that period. Besides, by just looking at the supply elasticities we cannot say that 
the euro has no chance to become an international currency, but it may be concluded that 
other than the advantages we counted before for the US, the US also have an advantage of 
                                                 
       
· The explanation to this issue may be found in Appendix A supply elasticity. This is an advantage to the extent that the strength of the international 
currency is trade balanced. It may be concluded that the Euro Zone must improve its 
production  techniques,  check  over  its  economies  of  scale  and  try  to  become  more 
adaptive. In current circumstances if a price increase occurs it is likely that the Euro zone 
will lose most off its competitiveness against the US in the international trade arena.  
 










USA  3.05012649  2.90465946  2.73727777  2.913354
Euro Zone  0.38340787   0.39348768  0.40268855  0.394084
 
4.2. Current Account and Trade Balance of the Euro Zone and the US 
Current  account  balance  and  trade  balance  are  also  important  issues  for  an 
international  currency.  Many  things  may  affect  the  amount  of  the  trade  and  current 
account deficit or surplus. In this research we will focus on two things. First one is the 
trend of the current account and trade account of the euro zone and the US, whether there 
is  a  time  effect  on  the  deficits  or  surpluses.  Secondly,  the  relation  between  the  trade 
balance and the current account balance will be investigated.  
 
    The quarterly data of the Euro zone and the US for current account and trade balance 
is used. The time period after the advent of the euro is chosen (1999-2003), so there are 20 
observations.  Firstly a trend equation is formed for both the current account and trade 
balance of the Euro zone as follows: 
 
    CAe = b0 + b1t                        (5) 
    TBe = a0 + a1t                        (6) 
 
where CAe and TBe denote the current account balance and the trade balance of the Euro 
zone respectively, and t is the time.  
 
    The adjusted R
2 of the regression for the equation (5) is 0.39, meaning that the time 
factor describes approximately 39% of the changes in the current account. Likewise, for the equation (6) we have an adjusted R
2 of 0.40. It may be concluded that the 40% of the 
changes in the trade balance may be described by the time factor. Of course this is just the 
time period of five years and five years is a very short time for a country. As there has 
been just five years since the advent of the euro, we had to choose this time period. We 
are aware of the fact that we cannot forecast the future conditions of the current account 
and trade balance with this limited data, but this analysis shows us the situation since the 
advent of the euro. 
 
    The same procedure is applied also for the US case. Again the same time period is 
chosen for the sake of completeness and in order to be able to compare the two. The 
following two equations are estimated for the current account and trade balance of the US 
respectively. 
 
    CAU = d0 + d1t                       (7) 
    TBU = w0 + w1t                        (8) 
 
Here the notation is same as before. The adjusted R
2s of equation (7) and equation (8) are 
0.76 and 0.69. It may be concluded that time is an important determinant of both the trade 
and the current account balance of the US in these five years. 
 
    Secondly, we are interested in the relationship between the current account and trade 
balance.  In order to investigate this issue the following equations are estimated for the 
Euro zone and the US. 
 
    CAe = a + b TBe                        (9) 
    CAU = c + d TBU                      (10) 
 
   The notation is as follows: CAe and CAU denote the current account balance of the Euro 
zone and the US respectively. TBe represent the trade balance of the Euro zone and TBU 
denote the trade balance of the US.   
 
 Table 4.3 Regression Results  
 
Sample: 1999:1 2003:4  
 
  a  b  R
2  Adj. R














0.95522  0.95273  1.3581  383.9 
      All coefficients are significant at 1% level.  
 
The regression results for the Euro zone is shown in the Table 4.3. From the estimated 
equation it may concluded that an increase of one SDR in trade balance of the Euro zone 
will cause approximately an increase of 1.09 SDR in its current account balance. It may be 
said  that  trade  balance  is  the  most  important  factor  that  affects  the  current  account 
balance. The changes in other items that form up the current account as current transfers, 
income, etc. do not have a significant effect on the magnitude of the current account 
surplus or deficit.  
 
    As it may be observed in the Figure 4.2, the Euro zone had not given any trade deficit 
in the chosen period. On the other hand between the period of the third quarter of 1999 
and second quarter of 2001 and in the second quarter of 2002 it had given current account 
deficits. It may be concluded that in these periods the other factors had more effect on the 
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    Figure 4.2 Trade and Current Account Balance of the Euro Zone     Furthermore, the Z formula
· is used to express the data of the current account and 
trade balance as standard deviations from the mean. This procedure reduces the two data 
series to the same scale. The Figure 4.3 shows the transformed form of the current account 
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   Figure  4.3  Trade  and  Current  Account  Balance  of  the  Euro  Zone  expressed  as 
standard deviations from the mean 
 
 
    From Figure 4.3, it may be concluded that there is a very close relationship between 
the  trade  and  current  account  balance.  Since  the  beginning  of  2000  current  account 
balance follows the trade balance with one period of lag.  
 
In Table 4.3 the regression results for the equation (10) may be observed. Here we can 
say that an increase of one SDR in trade balance will cause an increase of 1.19 SDR in 
current account balance. The same result as in the case of the Euro zone may be also 
concluded for the US case. The changes in the current account balance may be mostly 
described by the changes in the trade balance rather than the other items current account.  
 
Unlike the euro case, the US had always given both trade and current account deficits 
between the years 1999 and 2003 (Figure 4.4). Since the beginning of 1999, the current 
account and trade deficit of the US has more than tripled. The close relationship between 
                                                 
· Zi = 
s
-
- X X i  where 
-
X  denotes the mean of the data set, while s shows the standard deviation. 
 the trade and current account of the US may be observed in both Figure 4.4 and Figure 
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   Figure 4.5 Trade and Current Account   Balance of the US expressed as standard 
deviations from the mean 
 
 
Giving trade deficits is a way to be an international currency. This does not mean that 
they should always give trade deficits and no country can have trade deficits for decades, 
but giving trade deficits is a way to be used wide spread. But while giving trade deficits if 
a country has a current account surplus that means the money that it sends out by giving 
trade deficits turns back to the country in means of other factors. We did this analysis in 
order to see if there is such a situation in the Euro zone and the US. The results show us 
that there is a very close and positive relationship between the current account and trade balance of both. An export that has a value of one SDR has a reflection of 1.09 SDR on 
the  current  account  of  Euro  zone.  The  Euro  zone  has  link  to  feed  the  world  with  its 
currency. It is also true for the US. Both the US and the Euro zone have developed a 
penetration  to  make  their  currency  international  by  having  trade  and  current  account 
deficits. Although the Euro zone has never had a trade deficit in the chosen period and has 
a current account surplus recently, if it starts to give trade deficit, it will also have current 
account deficit. Our analysis shows that the link between the trade and current account 
deficit of the US is higher than that of the Euro zone, although the difference between 
them is very small. Both parts have a potential to feed the world with their currency 
although the Euro zone do not use it at the moment.  
 
Table 4.4 Regression Results for the Euro Zone and the US (Trend) 
 
  R
2  Adjusted R
2 
CAe  0.424852  0.392900 
TBe  0.430885  0.399267 
CAU  0.772402  0.759758 
TBU  0.708254  0.692046 
 
The world’s reserve volume is increasing. There may be two reasons for that. The first 
one  is  the  growth  in  the  trade  volume  of  the  world.  We  will  discuss  the  recent 
developments in world trade in the next section. The second one is the decrease in the 
purchasing power parity of the currencies. If we think of the dollar case there is also a 
dilemma here. As the trade volume increases the agents need more dollars, but on the 
other hand as purchasing power parity of the dollar decreases they also want to substitute 
it with another currency. Here the euro comes into the scene. As the reserve need of the 
world is growing too fast, I think the dollar will not be able supply it alone. How much the 
euro take part will also depend on the amounts of the opposite effects discussed above.   
 
 
4.3. Global Trade 
 
In this section firstly the current situation in the world trade is analyzed and then the 
shares of the US and the Euro zone in the world trade are discussed. 
 4.3.1. World Trade in 2003 
According to World Trade Organization (WTO) economists a 2.5 percent increase in 
global output in 2003 spurred world trade to recover by 4.5 percent. Although this growth 
was stronger than expected a year ago, trade and output expansion in real terms in 2003 
remained below the average rates recorded since 1995. The expectations for 2003 were 
low because of the outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and the build-
up of tensions in the Middle East.  
 
In 2003, the regions that recorded the most dynamic trade performance were Asia and 
the transition economies. They increased their merchandise exports and imports between 
10 percent and 12 percent, more than twice as fast as world merchandise trade. China’s 
imports increased by 40 per cent in nominal dollar terms while its exports expanded by 35 
per cent.  
 
On the other hand Western Europe and Latin America showed a weak real import 
growth.  They  were  the  ones  that  recorded  the  weakest  import  growth  among  all  the 
regions, having a growth rate of less than 2 per cent. 
 
The  import  growth  of  the  United  States  exceeded  the  world  average  for  the  third 
successive year. Its import growth continues to exceed its export growth and its trade 
deficit continues to widen. Merchandise imports of United States went up by 5.7 per cent 
while its exports rose less than 3 per cent after two years of contracting export volumes. 
The merchandise trade deficit of United States reached $549 billion dollars, corresponding 
to 7.6 per cent of world merchandise exports in 2003.  
 
In  2003,  West  European  currencies  appreciated  strongly  vis-à-vis  the  dollar.  As  a 
result the dollar merchandise export value of these countries expanded faster than world 
trade,  but  in  volume  terms  there  had  been  a  near  stagnation.  Merchandise  exports  of 
Western Europe increased by less than 1 percent, while imports rose by nearly 2 per cent.  
 
There had been a 16 percent increase in world merchandise exports and they rose to 
$7.3 trillion. Commercial services exports rose by 12 per cent to $1.8 trillion. This was the 
strongest annual increase in nominal terms for both merchandise and services trade since 1995. In 2003, developing countries’ merchandise exports expanded by 17 percent and 
this increase had been slightly faster than their imports and the world average.  
 
China recorded an extraordinary expansion in merchandise trade in 2003 and became 
the third in the ranking of the world’s leading merchandise importers.  
 
Many oil exporting countries (such as Russia and Saudi Arabia) and the countries with 
appreciating currencies like Western Europe had nominal export growth more than 20 per 
cent. Germany’s merchandise exports again exceeded those of the United States because 
of the appreciation of the euro. 
 
According to WTO report gains in the ranking of the leading commercial services 
traders in 2003 were principally recorded by Western European countries at the expense 
of  American  and  Asian  countries.  This  is  true  for  both  export  and  import  rankings. 
Western  Europe  and  transition  economies  recorded  annual  gains  in  their  exports  and 
imports of services ranging from 16 percent to 21 percent, while Asia and Latin America’s 
export expansion was limited to 6 percent. The imports of North America continued to 
expand much faster than exports in 2003, such that its surplus in services trade was further 
reduced. 
 
Dollar prices of internationally traded goods experienced their strongest increase since 
1995 and increased by 10.5 percent. There had been temporary supply shortfalls of oil 
because of the conflict in the Middle East and civil unrest in Venezuela and this caused up 
to 16 per cent increase in the prices of fuels. Prices of non-fuel commodities rose by 7 per 
cent on spot markets on average and there had been a 12 per cent increase in metal prices.  
 
4.3.2.  The Shares of the US and the EU in Global Trade 
After a brief summary of the recent developments in the world trade, now it is time to 
compare the positions of the US and the EU in the global trade. Table 4.5 shows the trade 
patterns of the US, the EU
· and Japan. It may be observed that all the three countries make 
the  highest  percentage  of  their  trade  with  their  neighbors.  The  EU  makes  the  highest 
percentage of its trade with non-EU European countries and Asian countries except Japan 
                                                 
        
· Intra EU trade between the 15 member countries is not taken into account. and the US follow them. 28% of the total exports of the US is with the continent of 
America while Japan exports 25.3% of its total exports to Asian countries.  
 
In order to form the Table 4.5 Eurostat and World Trade Organization data are used. 
As Eurostat gave the percentages directly for EU no calculations is made, but for the US 
and Japan the first forty commodities that have the largest share of the total exports and 
the imports of the countries are found separately. From the World Trade Organization data 
the rankings of the countries for these forty commodities are taken. For each commodity 
the leading two markets, and their share in total export (or import) of the US or Japan are 
found. The trade partner countries are grouped as shown in the table and the individual 
countries’  shares  are  added  up  to  find  the  total  share  of  the  group.  The  chosen  forty 
commodities make up the 50 to 60% of the total trade of the US and Japan, so it is 
assumed that the rest will also be distributed in the same way. 
 
In order to be able to make some comments about the use of the euro, the dollar and 
the yen in international trade invoicing we have to make also some other assumptions. 
Hartmann  (1998)  states  these  assumptions  under  the  heading  “Stylized  facts  of  trade 
invoicing behavior”. He mentions that there are a number of regularities observed in the 
choice of currencies for the invoicing of international trade (Grassman, 1973; Page, 1981; 
Black,  1990;  Tavlas,  1991).  First,  for  trade  in  manufactured  goods  between  industrial 
countries the major part of contracts are denominated in the exporter’s currency and most 
of the remaining contracts are denominated in the importer’s currency, while the third-
currency  invoicing  is  relatively  rare  (Grassman’s  Law)
·.  Second,  in  most  cases  the 
industrial country’s currency or a third currency is used for trade between industrial and 
developing  countries.  Finally,  inflationary  currencies  are  used  less  in  their  country’s 
foreign trade than less inflationary currencies. Hartmann’s fourth and fifth assumptions 
are not taken as I have some doubts about their validity for the current international trade 
transactions and also they are not very important for the analysis that I will make.  
 
                                                 
· Grassman’s Law highlights the home-currency preference in international trade. However, there are some 
important exceptions like Japan (Hartmann, 1998)  
Table 4.5 The Trade Composition of the Three Major Countries 
 
  EU  US  Japan 
Exports to       
US  9.3% -  31.2%
EU  -  4.8% 4.8%
Japan  1.6% 2.0% - 
America (Excluding US)  3.1% 28.0% 2.9%
Asia (Excluding Japan)  9.4% 5.0% 25.3%
Oceania  0.8% 0.7% 0.4%
Non EU European Countries  12.3% 0.5% na 
       
Imports From       
US  6.8% -  13.0%
EU  -  6.6% 2.9%
Japan  2.7% 9.1% - 
America (Excluding US)  2.7% 23.3% 0.8%
Asia (Excluding Japan)  12% 12.8% 33.9%
Oceania  0.5% na  3.5%
Non EU European Countries  12.0% na  na 
            n.a = not applicable 
   Source: WTO, Eurostat, author’s own calculations 
 
 
In order to find the invoicing shares for the major three currencies first the Table 4.5 is 
extended. The total amount of exports and imports of the three countries are found from 
IFS and all are converted into SDR in order to eliminate the exchange rate problems. 
According to the shares found before, the total amount of exports and imports that each 
country makes with each group is calculated. After that according to the assumptions that 
are stated previously the total amount of trade that is denominated by each currency is 
found out and the shares of them are calculated. It is assumed that the exports of the EU, 
the US and Japan are denominated in their own currencies. And for imports it is assumed 
that the EU imports from Asia, Oceania and non-EU European countries in terms of euro, 
while the trade within the continent of America is denominated in the dollar. It is also 
assumed that the imports of the US from Asia (excluding Japan) and continent of America 
are denominated in dollars. For Japan the trade with Asia is assumed to be in yen. As a 
result, it is concluded that 49% of the trade in 2002 is denominated in dollars, while the 
euro and the yen have shares of 28% and 23% respectively. I am aware of the fact that 
with the assumptions above probably the share of yen is overestimated. As Japan does not want its currency to be a dominant one and also for some other reasons it does not usually 
use  its  currency  as  an  invoicing  currency  for  its  exports,  but  as  it  is  not  possible  to 
determine in what percent of its exports it uses its currency as an invoicing currency and 
for the sake of consistency with the assumptions no manipulation is made. It may be 
concluded that the dollar is the dominant money in invoicing of the global trade but the 
euro has also a potential and it is the second most used currency. With the expansion 
process the members of the EU will increase and as a result the trade amount of the union 
will increase. In the future this may bring the euro the chance to catch up with the dollar 
as an invoice currency in the global trade.  
 
There is also another important factor that may affect the invoicing patterns of the 
global trade. We observe that crude petroleum oils are the one of the most important 
import commodities for the US and Japan. In the ranking it is number one for Japan and 
number two for the US. Approximately 11% of the total imports of the Japan and 7% of 
the total imports of the US is for the crude petroleum oils. The import share of the EU 
from OPEC countries is 2.8%. When the shares of these countries in the world trade are 
concerned it may be concluded that the decision of the OPEC countries for the invoicing 
currency may have some effect on determining the dominant currency. The US imports of 
crude petroleum oils has a share of 33.1% in the total crude petroleum oils trade of the 
world and the leading exporting countries to the US are Saudi Arabia and Mexico with the 
shares of 16% and 14% respectively. 14.6% of the total world crude petroleum trade is 
made by Japan and Saudi Arabia is again the main exporter country to Japan. Oil is not 
only the most important commodity traded internationally, but also it is the lifeblood of all 
the industrialized economies. If a country does not have oil, it has to buy it. Therefore 
OPEC countries’ decision about the invoicing currency for oil is an important issue. Until 
recently all OPEC countries agreed to sell their oil for dollars only. Let’s think about the 
other extreme. If OPEC countries were to decide to accept only euros for its oil, then 
firstly Europe would not need, as many dollars as before, besides Japan would think to 
convert a large portion of its dollar assets to euro assets. On the other hand the US, being 
the world’s largest oil importer would have to run trade surplus to acquire euros. The 
conversion from trade deficit to trade surplus would be very painful for the US. Of course 
this is an extreme case, but it is important to see how decisions of OPEC countries may 
change the flows in the world trade. 
 Until now only one OPEC country switched to the euro: Iraq, in November 2000. Also 
Iran and Venezuela has been talking publicly about possible conversion to the euro. Of 
course switching to euro is not only an economical but also a political decision, as it is 
beyond my scope I do not want to comment about this. The point that I want take attention 
is the fact that the invoice currency decision of OPEC countries may have some effect on 
determining the dominant invoice currency of the world.  
 
 
5.  Euro vs Dollar in International Financial Markets 
 
In this section firstly the current situation of the international financial markets will be 
discussed and then an empirical case will be made on international bonds market. 
 
 
5.1. Current Situation in International Financial Markets 
The US economy is the world’s largest economy. The GDP of the US accounts for 
22% of the world’s total at purchasing power parity based exchange rates. The world’s 
second largest economy is the euro land, accounting for 16% of world GDP (on the same 
basis); and this share is supposed expand to 20% if all present member of the European 
Union started to use the euro, and would expand even further with new participants in the 
EU and euro area. Japan’s GDP is slightly less than half of the present euro area and 
Japanese yen is the currency with the third largest domain of domestic use. It can be 
concluded that the dollar and the euro are the two most important currencies of the world. 
 
Both  the  dollar  and  the  euro  are  likely  to  play  important  roles  as  international 
currencies  because  both  of  them  have  very  large  domains  of  domestic  use  and  these 
domains are highly open to international trade and financial transactions. These currencies 
are used as medium of transaction, stores of value, units of account, etc also by non-
residents.  
 
The euro became undoubtedly more convenient for many foreigners after it replaced 
the predecessor currencies. This situation also works for the US residents as well as other 
foreigners. Before the euro US business with the euro area were done in dollars rather 
than the predecessor currencies of the euro. After the replacement of these currencies by euro  some  of  these  transactions  will  now  be  done  in  euro.  It  may  be  said  that  the 
international role of the euro has increased at the expense of the dollar. This does not 
imply  the  US  residents  suffer  from  this  situation  as  the  US  residents  that  are  doing 
business with the euro area; now find it more convenient to work in euro. 
 
The advent of the euro has a created competition for the dollar as international money 
by having a domestic base roughly the same size and general attractiveness. Before the 
advent of the euro it was anticipated that it would rise rapidly and would catch up with the 
dollar. This paper is based on my thesis named “How should reserve money be? Does the 
euro have a chance?” Detailed information about the position of the euro and the dollar 
may be found in that thesis.  In the thesis the  situations of the dollar  and the euro in 
different financial forms such as international monetary market instruments, international 
bonds  and  notes,  international  debt  securities,  derivatives,  official  holdings  of  foreign 
exchange,  banks’  local  positions  in  foreign  currency,  and  international  investment 
positions. Briefly, in international financial markets, our findings in the thesis show us the 
fact that the euro has already caught up with the US dollar and even passed it except for 
the reserves of the central banks. Also in these official holdings the euro has an increasing 
trend, but still far beyond the share of the US dollar (Göksel, 2004).  
 
5.2. Empirical Study on International Bonds and Notes 
There  are  a  number  of  reasons  for  choosing  to  make  the  empirical  study  on 
international  bonds  and  notes.  The  idea  is  taken  from  the  paper  of  Frenkel  and 
Søndergaard (1999), who gave three reasons, which are also valid today, for this. The first 
reason is the fact that these international assets account for a high share in international 
private portfolios. Secondly, for these assets relatively complete and consistent data are 
available. Finally, virtually the same type of asset can be held in alternative currencies so 
that the currency of denomination and the expected return on it is the most important 
factor in the demand for these assets in a specific currency (Frenkel and Søndergaard, 
1999). Although the cases of both international bonds and international bank deposits are 
taken  in  the  work  of  Frenkel  and  Søndergaard,  in  this  research  just  the  case  of 
international  bonds  and  notes  will  be  taken.  International  bond  holdings  are  very 
important in quantitative terms. According to the Bank for International Settlements report 
(March, 2004) at the end of 2003, they amounted to about 11.1 trillion US dollars. 
 Although  the  main  idea  is  taken  from  the  work  of  Frenkel  and  Søndergaard,  the 
reasons of doing this research is different from them in some aspects. Their research is 
done in order to project EMU effects on the currency shares of the international bonds and 
they investigated the results for EMU-11 and EMU-15 and compared them. The shares 
that they found for the dollar are very close to the current shares, but they underestimated 
the euro shares while overestimating the yen shares. The reason of this is probably the fact 
that they used the share of Deutsche mark in order to estimate the demand function for 
EMU. Currently we know the shares of the currencies in international bond markets more 
precisely, as five years have passed since the advent of the euro, so demand functions for 
international bonds are estimated using these data. Frenkel and Sondergaard used eight 
years’ quarterly data (1990-1997) and in this research again eight years’ quarterly data is 
used (1996-2003). 
 
It is assumed that the width of a market represents an important factor for the currency 
structure of private bond portfolios. The higher the width of a market, ceteris paribus the 
more liquid are the assets. Therefore, the demand for assets denominated in the currency 
of  this  market  will  be  more.  The  stability  of  the  currency  in  which  the  bonds  are 
denominated is another factor in determining the currency structure of international bond 
portfolios. Investors are likely to prefer bonds denominated in low inflation currencies 
rather than in currencies with higher inflation. The analysis is restricted to the dollar, the 
euro and the yen. As a proxy for the market width, the GDP share of the United States, 
Euro zone and Japan in the total GDP of these three countries is used. The GDP amounts 
of the countries are converted to SDR in order to eliminate the exchange rate differences.  
 
Based on these considerations the following equation is estimated for the share of 
bonds denominated in currency i, which is denoted by Sharei (i = dollar, euro or yen): 
 
Sharei,t = b0GDPi,t + b1Infi,t + et                  (11) 
 
 
Here GDPi represents the GDP share, Inf is the inflation rate, and e is the error term. 
As a proxy for the inflation rate the actual inflation rates of the three countries during the 
two subsequent years are used and moving averages of the rates are taken. Using the 
quarterly data published by the Bank for International Settlements for the period 1996 through 2003, OLS estimates are performed. For 1996 through 1998, all the international 
bonds that are issued in preceding currencies of the euro are added up. In order to find the 
GDP of the Euro zone for the period 1996-1998, individual GDP amounts of the EMU 
countries are added up, after converted into SDR.  
 
In  this  research,  different  from  the  analysis  of  Frenkel  and  Søndergaard,  the 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) Method will be used. It is believed that the ideal 
thing to do would be to estimate the shares of all three currencies together, as they depend 
on  each  other.  In  order  to  prevent  autocorrelation,  first  the  equations  are  regressed 
individually to see whether they have any significance problems.  
 
    Table 5.1 shows the results of the first OLS estimates of the euro. The value that 
Durbin Watson statistics takes shows us that there is first order serial correlation. In order 
to get rid off this correlation the AR (1) Method is used. The result of it is shown in Table 
5.1 and the estimated equation in this result will be used in the system. Although we 
couldn’t  find  a  significant  coefficient  for  the  inflation,  the  coefficient  of  AR(1)  is 
significant, which shows us the fact that using this method is a true decision. The same 
procedure is applied also for the US. The regression results of the share of the bonds 
issued in US dollar is shown in Table 5.1. 
 
In the US case, there seems to be no serial correlation and the results are significant. 
As there is no serial correlation equation (11) will be used in the system. 
 
When we look at the regression results of Japan (Table 5.1), which is found by using 
the  same  method,  we  again  observe  a  first  order  serial  correlation.  As  there  is  serial 
correlation, again the AR (1) method is used and the results in Table 5.1 are found. 
 
The comparison of the three equations gives us some clues about the three currencies. 
First, it has to be noted that to use the AR (1) method is not always a true decision, 
because there may be some quarterly effects as we are using the quarterly data and also 
we do not have an intercept term in our equation. We are using a quarterly data, so there 
may be some seasonal effects. But as we have a small data set, using AR (4) would not be 
a realistic decision. We are aware of these shortcomings, but as the coefficients of the AR(1) are significant in both the Euro zone and the Japan case, it is believed that using 
this method is a true decision. 
 
      Table 5.1 Regression Results 
   
Sample: 1996:1 2003:4 
  GDP  Inf  AR(1)  R
2  Adj. R
2  DW  F 
Euro 
Zone 















0.522  0.488    15.271 
US 







  0.287  0.263  1.975  12.064 
Japan 



















0.599  0.569    20.880 
        * Significant at 1% level 
        ** Significant at 5% level 
1-  Normal regression 
2-  Regression with AR(1) Method 
 
A system is formed and the SUR Method is applied. The results may be observed from 
Table 5.2. 
 
The results are in line with our assumptions. The GDP share of the issuer country of 
the currency has a positive relationship with the share of the currency in international 
bonds market, while the inflation rate has a negative one.  The coefficient of the GDP 
share of the Euro zone has the highest value; 3.56, which shows us that a unit increase in 
the  GDP  share  of  the  Euro  area  will  cause  3.56  units  increase  in  its  share  in  the 
international bonds market at the expense of the US and Japan. The US has a coefficient 
of 2.42 for its GDP share, which is also a relatively high number, although not as high as 
that of the Euro area. Japan has the lowest coefficient, but still has a positive relationship 
between  its  GDP  share  and  the  share  of  yen  denominated  bonds  in  the  international markets. As a result it may be said that the Euro zone has a higher potential to increase its 
share in international bonds market by increasing its GDP share than the US or Japan do 
have. 
 
  Table 5.2 The Results of the SUR Method 
 
Estimation Method:  Iterative Seemingly Unrelated Regression 







b0  3.563512  1.267546  0.0061 
b1  9.29E-05  0.000393  0.8137 
a0  2.424483  0.315366  0.0000 
a1  -0.009122  0.001795  0.0000 
d0  1.872307  0.427414  0.0000 
d1  -0.001856  0.000529  0.0007 
Equation: Sharee,t- (0,767113 Sharee,t-1) = b0(GDPe,t-0.676113 GDPe,t-1)+ b1Infe,t 
R Squared  0.268434  Adjusted R Squared  0.243207 
Equation: Shared,t = a0 GDPd,t + a1 Infd,t 
R Squared  0.278796  Adjusted R Squared  0.254756 
Equation: Sharey,t- (0,571880 Sharey,t-1) = d0(GDPy,t-0.571880 GDPy,t-1)+ d1Infy,t 
R Squared  0.231292  Adjusted R Squared  0.204785 
 
 
The inflation coefficient that is found for the euro zone is not significant. For the other 
two countries it may be concluded that the inflation has a higher negative effect on the 
share of bonds in the US than in Japan.  
 
    With the above analysis we cannot make a prediction, as it has no restriction such as 
the summation of the shares should give the value 1. As a result of this when we try to 
predict the new share after one percent increase in GDP we find values greater than one. 
In order to be able to make predictions we will use the market share attraction model (Fok 
et al, 2001). 
 
  In the spirit of attraction models: 
  Ai,t = f (GDPi,t, Infi,t) + ei,t                    (12) 
where Ai,t is the attraction of the country i at time t, t = 1,……T. GDPi,t and Infi,t denote 
the GDP share and the inflation rate of the country.  
     The market shares for the I brands follow from the Market Share Attraction Theorem 
(Bell et al, 1975). In this theorem the market share of brand i is equal to its attraction 
relative to the sum of all attractions. 
 











,    for i = 1,……,I                (13) 
The model in (12) and (13) is usually called the market share attraction model. In our 
analysis we will use the countries instead of brands.  
 
    In our research we took Japan as the base country and we tried the find out the market 




























, b b     i = Euro Zone, the US      (14) 
Here Mi,t shows the market shares of country,  while MI,t denotes the  market share of 
Japan. Ai,t and AI,t show the attraction models for the countries in the same manner. GDPi,t 
is the GDP shares of the countries and GDPI,t is the GDP share of the base country. 
Likewise Infi,t and InfI,t denote the inflation rates of the countries and the inflation rate of 
the base country respectively. 
 
    We form two equations; one for the Euro zone and for the US. As before, first the 
individual equations are regressed in order to see whether there is autocorrelation or not. 
The Durbin-Watson statistic for the US case is above the critical values, so there is not an 
autocorrelation, but we can not say the same for the Euro zone. Its value for the Durbin 
Watson statistic is far below the critical values, so we apply AR (1) Method. As there is 
no autocorrelation in the US case its equation stays the same as before. Using these two 
equations we form a system and estimate it by the SUR method. The results may be 
observed in Table 5.3. 
 
    As before the results support our assumptions. There is a positive relationship between 
the GDP share and market share and a negative relationship between the inflation share 
and market share. According to these results we may conclude that a one percent increase in the GDP share of the Euro zone will cause 4.3% ( = 1- e
0,0423949) increase in the market 
share of euro denominated bonds and a percent increase in the GDP share of the US will 
cause 0.6% (= 1 - e
0.00564803) increase in the market share of dollar denominated bonds. It 
may  be  concluded  that  the  Euro  zone  has  a  higher  potential  to  increase  its  share  by 
increasing its GDP relative to the US. This result is consistent with the one we found 
before. As we couldn’t found a significant coefficient for the inflation rate of the US we 
cannot command on it, but we may say that one percent increase in the inflation rate of 
Euro zone relative to Japan will cause its market share by 0.002% (1 – e
-0.00221742).   
 
Table 5.3 The Results of SUR Method (Attraction Model) 
Estimation Method:  Iterative Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
Sample: 1996:1 – 2003:4 
 
Coefficient 
Std Error  Prob (t-stat) 
b0  4.232949  0.956544  0.0000 
b1  -0.221742  0.085005  0.0115 
a0  0.564803  0.144604  0.0002 
a1  -0.466713  0.286838  0.1090 
Equation: Sharee/y,t-(0,741172Sharee/y,t-1)=b0(GDPe/y,t-0.741172GDPe/y,t-1)+ b1Infe/y,t 
R Squared  0.353844  Adjusted R Squared  0.331562 
Equation: Shared/y,t = a0 GDPd/y,t + a1 Infd/y,t 
R Squared  0.419951  Adjusted R Squared  0.400616 
 
6.  Conclusion 
Our findings in this research also make it clear that the euro is and will be a real rival 
for the US dollar. The competition between the dollar and the euro is investigated in many 
phases. When we look at the main economic indicators both parts have nearly the same 
values, although in some issues the US has slightly higher numbers. It is obvious that the 
US is the dominant power in international politics at the moment, but the EU also tries to 
take its role in the international scene nowadays. In terms of supply elasticity the dollar 
has an advantage over the euro, while the opposite is true for the financial markets. In 
international financial markets, our findings show us the fact that the euro has already 
caught up with the US dollar and even passed it except for the reserves of the central 
banks. Also in these official holdings the euro has an increasing trend, but still far beyond 
the share of the US dollar. Nevertheless, the euro has a high potential to increase its share in international bond markets. The US dollar has an advantage of being used more as an 
invoicing currency in international trade, but the euro is the second most used one and 
shows an increasing trend. Furthermore, in both parts the current account deficit or surplus 
is mostly affected by the trade deficit or surplus. Neither part faces with huge capital 
inflows  or  outflows  that  will  cause  fluctuations  in  their  current  account  balance.  The 
analysis shows that their current account balances have a trend and do not show high 
fluctuations. It may be concluded that both parts have rather stable economies, which is a 
very important factor in becoming an international currency. Being an invoicing currency 
in the international trade is also an important factor that determines the international role 
of a currency. Now, the dollar is the most used currency as an invoicing currency and the 
euro follows it with a percentage of 28%. As oil is an important commodity in global 
trade, in terms of value, if the pricing of oil were to shift to the euro, it could provide a 
boost to the global acceptability of the single currency. One of the arguments for keeping 
oil pricing and payments in dollars has been that the US remains a large importer of oil, 
despite being a substantial crude oil producer itself. However, looking at the statistics of 
crude  oil  exports,  one  notes  that  the  Euro zone  is  an  even  larger  importer  of  oil  and 
petroleum products than the US.  
 
As soon as its advent, the euro became the second most used currency in the world. 
All of the analyses made in this research show us the potential of the euro to become an 
international currency. Although the US dollar has still some advantages over the euro, the 
euro shows an increasing trend. Besides, the world economy is growing day by day and 
the  burden  of  being  a  single  international  currency  will  be  huge  to  the  issuer  of  that 
currency. In my opinion a bipolar currency regime dominated by Europe and the United 
States, with perhaps Japan as a junior partner, will replace the dollar-centered system that 
has continued for most of this century. I think that in the near future no single economy 
would  be  able  to  carry  this  huge  burden,  but  in  order  to  have  this  bipolar  stability  a 
transatlantic cooperation is required to handle both the transition to the new regime and its 






 APPENDIX A 
 
  The Coefficient “b” is Equal to the Supply Elasticity 
 
Our GDP function is: 
 
  GDP = a 
b
L P                       (A1) 
 
  When we take the logarithm of this function we get: 
 
  log GDP = log a + b log PL                  (A2) 
 
  The formula for elasticity of supply is equal to: 
 










 in equation B3 means the derivative of GDP according to PL and equals to: 
  a  b  P
1 - b
L   and  from  equation  B1  we  know  what  GDP  equals  to,  so  the  equation 
becomes: 








1 -                     (A4) 
 
es = b PL
b-1+1-b                      (A5) 
 
es = b PL
0                      (A6) 
 
es = b 1                       (A7) 
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